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Peer E¤ects in Science
Evidence from the Dismissal of Scientists in Nazi Germany
Fabian Waldinger (University of Warwick)
July 5, 2011
Abstract
This paper analyzes peer e¤ects among university scientists. Specically, it investi-
gates whether the quality and the number of peers a¤ect the productivity of researchers in
physics, chemistry, and mathematics. The usual endogeneity problems related to estimat-
ing peer e¤ects are addressed by using the dismissal of scientists by the Nazi government
in 1933 as a source of exogenous variation in the peer group of scientists staying in Ger-
many. To investigate localized peer e¤ectes, I construct a new panel dataset covering the
universe of scientists at the German universities from 1925 to 1938 from historical sources.
I nd no evidence for peer e¤ects at the local level. Even very high quality scientists do
not a¤ect the productivity of their local peers.
1 Introduction
It is widely believed that localized peer e¤ects are important among academic researchers.
Individual researchers do not necessarily take these e¤ects into account when they decide where
to locate. This may result in misallocation of talent and underinvestment in academic research.
Having a good understanding of peer e¤ects is therefore crucial for researchers and policy
makers alike. In this paper I analyse localized peer e¤ects among scientists whose research is
often believed to be an important driver of technological progress. Understanding these e¤ects
may therefore be particularly important for science policy-makers in a knowledge based society.
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and three anonymous referees for very helpful comments. I also thank Pierre Azoulay, Oriana Bandiera, Mar-
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Klaus Fischer, Reinhard Siegmund-Schulze, Richard Staley, and David Wilkins provided very valuable informa-
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Despite the widespread belief in the presence of peer e¤ects in academia, there is very little
empirical evidence for these e¤ects. Obtaining causal estimates of peer e¤ects is challenging
because of a number of problems. An important issue complicating the estimation of peer e¤ects
is the sorting of individuals. Highly productive scientists often choose to locate in the same
universities. Sorting may therefore introduce a positive correlation of scientistsproductivities
within universities which has not been caused by peer e¤ects. Another problem complicating
the estimation of peer e¤ects is the presence of unobservable factors which a¤ect a researchers
productivity but also the productivity of his peers. Measurement problems further increase the
di¢ culty of obtaining unbiased estimates for peer e¤ects. A promising empirical strategy would
therefore be a setup where a scientists peer group changes due to reasons which are unrelated
to his own productivity.
In this paper I propose the dismissal of scientists by the Nazi government in 1933 as an
exogenous change in the peer group of researchers in Germany. Only 66 days after Hitlers
National Socialist party secured power the Nazi government dismissed all Jewish and so called
politically unreliable scholars from German universities. Around 13 to 18 percent of uni-
versity scientists were dismissed between 1933 and 1934 (13.6 percent of physicists, 13.1 of
chemists, and 18.3 percent of mathematicians). Many of the dismissed scholars were outstand-
ing members of their profession, among them the famous physicist and Nobel Laureate Albert
Einstein, the chemist Georg von Hevesy who received the Nobel Prize in 1943, and the Hun-
garian mathematician Johann von Neumann. Scientists in a¤ected departments were therefore
exposed to a dramatic change in their peer group. Researchers in departments which had
not employed Jewish or politically unreliablescholars did not experience any dismissals and
therefore no changes to their peer groups.
I use a large number of historical sources to construct the dataset for my analysis. From
historical university calendars I assemble a panel of the universe of physicists, chemists, and
mathematicians working at German universities between 1925 and 1938. I combine this data
with a complete list of all dismissals and with publication data to measure productivity.
This allows me to obtain the rst clean estimate of localized peer e¤ects among scientists
using exogenous variation in the quality and quantity of peers in a researchers department.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, I do not nd any evidence for peer e¤ects within a scientists
department. This nding is robust to narrowing the peer group to peers from the same special-
ization only; i.e. by considering only theoretical physicists when constructing the peer group
for theoretical physicists. Recent work on life scientists suggests that star scientistshave a
particularly large e¤ect on their colleaguesproductivity (Azoulay, Zivin, and Wang, 2010 and
Oettl 2009). As the dismissals include some of the most prominent scientists of their time, I
can investigate how the loss of top quality peers a¤ects the productivity of scientists staying
in Germany. The results indicate that even the loss of very high quality peers does not have a
negative impact on the productivity of stayers.
One may be concerned that the dismissals a¤ected the productivity of stayers through other
channels than peer e¤ects. Most of these expected biases, such as an increased teaching load or
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an increase in administrative duties, would lead me to overestimate the e¤ect of peers. There
are, however, other potential biases that could lead to an underestimation of peer e¤ects. I
discuss these threats to the identication strategy below and show evidence that the dismissals
are uncorrelated with changing incentives, changes is funding, and the number of ardent Nazi
supporters in the a¤ected departments. Furthermore, I show that di¤erent productivity trends
in a¤ected and una¤ected departments cannot explain my ndings.
Few papers have empirically analysed localized spillovers among university scientists. One
example is Weinberg (2007) who analyses peer e¤ects among Nobel Prize winners in physics.
He nds that physicists arriving in a city where other Nobel Laureates are working are more
likely to start Nobel Prize winning work. It is, however, not clear how much of this e¤ect is
driven by sorting of scientists. Dubois, Rochet, and Schlenker (2010) investigate externalities
among mathematicians in the United States. Similarly to the ndings in this paper they do
not nd evidence for peer e¤ects at the local level. While they have an extensive dataset of
mathematicians all over the world, they cannot rely on exogenous variation to identify peer
e¤ects. Similarly, Kim, Morse, and Zingales (2009) investigate peer e¤ects in economics and
nance and nd evidence for positive peer e¤ects in the 1970s and 1980s, but negative peer
e¤ects in the 1990s. While they consider selection of researchers into particular universities in
other specications, they do not address the selection of researchers in the specication that
directly tests localized peer e¤ects.1
Recently a number of studies have suggested that falling communication costs reduced the
importance of location in academic research (Kim, Morse, and Zingales, 2009, Adams et al.
2005, Agrawal and Goldfarb 2008, Rosenblat and Mobius, 2004). The ndings of this paper,
however, suggest that location was already history in the 1920s and 1930s - at least in
Germany.2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section gives a brief description
of historical details. Section 3 describes the construction of the dataset. Section 4 outlines the
identication strategy. The e¤ect of the dismissals on the productivity of scientists remaining
in Germany is analysed in section 5. I then use the dismissals as an exogenous source to identify
localized peer e¤ects in section 6. Section 7 discusses the ndings and concludes.
2 The Expulsion of Jewish and Politically Unreliable
Scholars from German Universities
Just over two months after the National Socialist Party seized power in 1933 the Nazi govern-
ment passed the "Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service" on the 7th of April,
1In addition to papers analysing peer e¤ects among university researchers there is a growing literature
examining peer e¤ects in other, mostly low skill, work environments (e.g. Mas and Moretti, 2008 and Bandiera,
Barankay, and Rasul, 2010).
2Similarly, Dubois, Rochet, and Schlenker (2010) who analyse mathematicians do not nd evidence that the
importance of location decreased between 1984 and 2006.
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1933. The law served as the legal basis to expel all Jewish and politically unreliablepersons
from the German civil service.3 The relevant paragraphs read:
Paragraph 3: Civil servants who are not of Aryan descent are to be placed in
retirement... (this) does not apply to o¢ cials who had already been in the service
since the 1st of August, 1914, or who had fought in the World War at the front for
the German Reich or for its allies, or whose fathers or sons had been casualties in
the World War.
Paragraph 4: Civil servants who, based on their previous political activities,
cannot guarantee that they have always unreservedly supported the national state,
can be dismissed from service.
["Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service", quoted after Hentschel
(1996)]
In a further implementation decree, Aryan descent was specied as follows: Anyone
descended from Non-Aryan, and in particular Jewish, parents or grandparents, is considered
non-Aryan. It is su¢ cient that one parent or one grandparent be non-Aryan.Christian sci-
entists were therefore dismissed if they had a least one Jewish grandparent. In many cases,
scientists would not have known that their colleague had Jewish grandparents. It is therefore
unlikely that the majority of the dismissed had been treated di¤erently by their colleagues
before the rise of the Nazi party. The decree also specied that all members of the Communist
Party were to be expelled under paragraph 4. The law was immediately implemented and re-
sulted in a wave of dismissals and early retirements from German universities. More than 1,000
academics were dismissed between 1933 and 1934 (Hartshorne, 1937). This amounts to about
15 percent of all 7,266 university researchers. Most dismissals occurred in 1933 immediately
after the law was implemented.
The law allowed exceptions for scholars of Jewish origin who had been in o¢ ce since 1914, or
who had lost a close family member in the First World War. Nonetheless, many of these scholars
decided to leave voluntarily; for example the Nobel Laureate James Franck, who resigned from
his professorship at the physics department in Göttingen, and Fritz Haber, a Nobel Laureate in
chemistry who resigned from the University of Berlin. These resignations merely anticipated a
later dismissal, as the Reich citizenship laws (Reichsbürgergesetz) of 1935 revoked all exception
clauses.
The vast majority of dismissed scientists emigrated and most of them obtained positions in
foreign universities. The most important emigration destinations were the United States, the
United Kingdom, Switzerland, Turkey, and the British Mandate of Palestine (later Israel). For
the purposes of this paper it is important to note that most emigrations took place immediately
after the researchers were dismissed from their university positions. Further collaborations with
3Most German university professors at the time were civil servants. Therefore the law was directly applicable
to them. Via additional ordinances the law was also applied to other university researchers who were not civil
servants.
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researchers staying in Germany were therefore extremely di¢ cult. A very small minority of the
dismissed did not leave Germany. Most of them died in concentration camps or committed
suicide. Extremely few managed to stay in Germany and survive the Nazi regime. Even
scientists staying in Germany were no longer allowed to use university laboratories and other
resources. The possibility of ongoing collaboration of the dismissed with scientists staying in
Germany was therefore extremely limited.
According to my calculations, 13.6 percent of physicists, 13.1 of chemists, and 18.3 percent
of mathematicians were dismissed between 1933 and 1934 (Table 1).4 The vast majority of
dismissals occurred between 1933 and 1934. Later dismissals a¤ected researchers who could
initially stay under the exception clause or if political reasons for a dismissal were discovered
later on. In order to have a sharp dismissal measure I therefore focus on the dismissals in 1933
and 1934.
My data does not allow me to identify whether the researchers were dismissed because they
were Jewish or for political reasons. Previous historical work indicates that the vast majority
of the dismissed were either Jewish or of Jewish descent. Deichmann (2001), for example, nds
that about 87 percent of dismissed chemists were of Jewish origin. Siegmund-Schultze (1998)
estimates that about 79 percent of dismissed mathematicians were of Jewish descent.
The aggregate number of dismissals hides the fact that German science departments were
a¤ected very di¤erently. Some departments lost more than half of their personnel while oth-
ers did not experience any dismissals. Even within a university there was a lot of variation
across di¤erent departments (Table 2). Whilst 40 percent of physicists and almost 60 percent
of mathematicians were dismissed from the renowned University of Göttingen there were no
dismissals in chemistry.
The top panel of Table 3 gives a more detailed picture of the quantitative and qualitative
loss in the three subjects. As has already been documented (Fischer, 1991) dismissed physicists
were younger than the average age but made above average scientic contributions, received
more Nobel Prizes (either before or after 1933), published more papers in top journals, and
received more citations.5 In chemistry, the dismissed were also of higher than average quality
but the di¤erence to the stayers was less pronounced. In mathematics many of the dismissed
were truly outstanding members of their profession and of much higher quality than the average
mathematician.
Table 3 also reports collaboration patterns before and after the dismissals. In physics, about
32 percent of the publications in top journals were coauthored. About 11 percent of all publica-
tions were coauthored with another scientist holding a faculty position at a German university.
This percentage is lower than the overall level of coauthoring because physicists coauthored ex-
tensively with assistants, Ph.D. students, and senior colleagues at research institutes or foreign
4These numbers are consistent with the numbers obtained by historians who have studied the dismissal of
scientists in Nazi Germany. Fischer (1991) reports that 15.5 percent of physicists were dismissed between 1933
and 1940. Deichmann (2001) calculates a loss of about 24 percent of chemists between 1933 and 1939. Her
gure is higher than mine because she considers all dismissals between 1933 and 1939 (while I focus on the 1933
to 1934 dismissals) and because my sample includes 5 additional universities with below average dismissals.
5For a more detailed description of the publications data see the data section.
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universities. The table also shows a low level of cooperation within departments; only 4 percent
of all publications were coauthored with faculty from the same university. In chemistry, 75 per-
cent of papers were coauthored, 12 percent were coauthored with a colleague holding a faculty
position, and only 4 percent were coauthored with a faculty member from the same department.
In mathematics these numbers were 17 percent, 10 percent, and 3 percent, respectively.
The table also shows that before 1933, the fraction of stayerspublications that were coau-
thored with scientists who were later dismissed was always higher than the fraction of the
dismissed in the population. While 13.6 percent of physicists were dismissed, 19 percent (=
(2.0/10.3)*100) of stayerscoauthoring activity could be accounted by collaboration with scien-
tists who were later dismissed. In chemistry, 15 percent of stayerscoauthoring activity involved
chemists who were later dismissed, and in mathematics 39 percent of stayerscoauthoring ac-
tivity involved mathematicians who were later dismissed.
The bottom part of table 3 shows publication and collaboration patterns for the post dis-
missal period. It shows that the productivity of the dismissed dropped substantially because
they were rst relocating and then restarting their career abroad. The panel also shows that
collaborations of stayers with dismissed scientists became very rare. Only 0.6 percent of papers
published by staying physicists were coauthored with the dismissed scientists. For chemistry
(0.4 percent) and mathematics (0 percent) these numbers were even lower. Figure A1 in the
online appendix shows collaboration patterns between stayers and dismissed scientists by year.
Not surprisingly, stayers and dismissed still coauthored in 1933 and 1934 (as the dismissals did
not occur until April 1933 and I also consider dismissals in 1934). After that, collaborations
fell sharply and even disappeared completely in many of the later years.
For comparison reasons, I report current collaboration patterns for the top 10 science and
economics departments in Germany and the United States focusing on tenured faculty (Table
A1 in the online appendix). Current collaboration patterns for German and U.S. science de-
partments look relatively similar.6 There is little coauthoring with researchers from the same
department. The big exception is physics with a high level of collaboration within departments.
This is mostly driven, however, by physicists conducting research involving particle accelerators;
a technology that was invented by E. Lawrence in Berkeley in 1930 and became rst available
in Germany in 1944, and thus after the time period analysed in this paper. The publications
involving results from particle accelerators usually list hundreds of authors (often more than
500, one article in the Physical Review Letters even has 744 authors). For physicists working
with particle accelerators, coauthoring does therefore not seem a very good measure for close
collaboration. If one excludes these physicists from the analysis (about 15 percent of physicists
overall), current collaboration patterns are more similar to the historical data for physicists as
well.
6See the data appendix for more details on the data of current science and economics departments. As
collaborations are measured with publications in top journals the data on within department level collaborations
is not very informative for current economics departments in Germany because only 33 of the 218 German
economists have published in a top 5 journal since 2000.
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3 Construction of a Panel Dataset of German Scientists
3.1 Data on Dismissed Scholars
I obtain data on dismissals from a number of historical sources. The main source is the List
of Displaced German Scholars (1937) from which I extract all dismissed physicists, chemists,
and mathematicians. The list was compiled by the relief organization Emergency Alliance of
German Scholars Abroad, which supported dismissed scholars in nding positions in foreign
universities. It contains about 1650 names of dismissed university researchers from all subjects.
Online appendix 2 shows a sample page from the physics section of the list. The page shows
four physicists who had already received the Nobel Prize or were to receive it in later years
(Figure A6).
For various reasons, for example if the dismissed died before the List of Displaced German
Scholars was compiled, a small number of dismissed researchers did not appear in the list. To get
a more complete measure of all dismissals I complement the data on dismissals with information
from secondary sources (Biographisches Handbuch, 1983, Beyerchen, 1977, Deichmann, 2001,
Siegmund-Schulze, 1998).7 Online appendix 2 contains more detail on data construction and
the secondary sources.
3.2 Data on all Scientists at German Universities between 1925 and
1938
To investigate the impact of the dismissals on scientists who stayed in Germany, I obtain data
on all scientists in German universities from 1925 to 1938. The data originate from historical
University Calendars (see online appendix 2 for details) from which I compile an annual ros-
ter of scientists in all physics, chemistry, and mathematics departments from winter semester
1924/1925 (lasting from November 1924 until April 1925) to winter semester 1937/1938.8 The
data contain all scientists who were at least Privatdozent. That is the rst university posi-
tion a researcher could obtain after the venia legendiand would allow the researcher to give
lectures at German universities.
In some specications I use the scientistsspecialization to identify their relevant peer group.
The data on specialisations come from seven volumes of Kürschners deutscher Gelehrten-
Kalender. The books are listings of German researchers compiled at irregular intervals since
1925. The Gelehrtenkalender contains about 90 percent of scientists in my sample. For the
remaining 10 percent I conduct an internet search to nd the scientistsspecialization. Overall,
I obtain information on the specialization for 98 percent of the scientists.9 Table A2 in online
appendix 1 gives an overview of all specialisations and the fraction of scientists in each of them.
7Slightly less than 20 percent of 1933 to 1934 dismissals only appear in the additional sources but not in the
List of Displaced German Scholars.
8Data for the technical universities were only published from winter semester 1927/1928 onwards.
9Some researchers name more than one specialization. Physicists and chemists therefore have up to two
specialisations and mathematicians up to four.
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3.3 Publication Data
To measure the productivity of scientists I construct a dataset containing the publications of
each researcher in the top academic journals of the time. In the period under consideration,
most German scientists published in German journals. German journals were of very high
quality because many of the German physicists, chemists, and mathematicians were among
the leaders in their profession. This is especially true for the time before the dismissals, as is
exemplied by the following quote; Before the advent of the Nazis the German physics journals
(Zeitschrift für Physik, Annalen der Physik, Physikalische Zeitschrift) had always served as the
central organs of world science in this domain [...] In 1930 approximately 700 scientic papers
were printed in its [the Zeitschrift für Physiks] seven volumes of which 280 were by foreign
scientists.(American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1941). Historical research
indicates that the journals considered in the analysis did not change substantially between
1933 and 1938 (Simonsohn, 2007). It is important to note, that the identication strategy
outlined below relies on changes in publications of researchers in German departments that
were di¤erentially a¤ected by the dismissals. A decline in the quality of the considered journals
would therefore not a¤ect my results, as all regressions are estimated including year xed e¤ects.
The top publications measure is based on articles contained in the online database ISI Web
of Science. The database is provided by Thomson Scientic and contains all contributions in
a large number of science journals. In 2004, the database was extended to include articles in
journals published between 1900 and 1945. The journals included in this backward extension
were all journals that had published the most relevant articles in the years 1900 to 1945. The
publication measure used in this paper therefore measures publications in the top journals of
the time.
I extract all German speaking general science, physics, chemistry, and mathematics journals
that are included in the database for the time period 1925 to 1938. Furthermore, I add the
leading general science journals that were not published in Germany, namely Nature, Science,
and the Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. I also include four non-German top
specialized journals that were suggested by historians of science as journals of some importance
for the German scientic community (see online appendix 2 for details). Online appendix Table
A3 lists all journals used in the analysis.
For each researcher I calculate two yearly productivity measures. The rst measure is equal
to the sum of publications in top journals in a given year. In order to quantify an articles
quality I also construct a second measure which accounts for the number of times the article
was cited in any journal included in the Web of Science in the rst 50 years after its publication.
This includes citations in journals that are not in my list of journals but that appear in the Web
of Science. As a result, this measure includes citations from the entire international scientic
community. It is therefore less heavily based on German science. I call this measure "citation
weighted publications" and it is dened as the sum of citations to all articles published in a
certain year.
Online appendix Table A4 lists the top 20 researchers for each subject according to the
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citation weighted publications measure. It is reassuring to realize that the vast majority of
these top 20 researchers are very well known in the scientic community. Economists will nd
it interesting that Johann von Neumann who emigrated to the Institute of Advanced Studies
in Princeton was the most cited mathematician. The large number of Nobel laureates among
the top 20 researchers indicates that citation weighted publications are a good measure of a
scholars productivity.
4 Identication
4.1 Estimating Peer E¤ects
Using this panel dataset I estimate peer e¤ects among scientists. The collaboration of re-
searchers can take di¤erent levels of intensity. A very direct way of peer interaction is the
collaboration on joint research projects involving joint publication of results. In many cases,
however, peer interactions are more subtle. Scientists discuss research ideas and comment
on each others work without copublishing. Yet another way in which peers may a¤ect a re-
searchers productivity is through peer pressure. Furthermore, peers may attract more research
funding to the department, or have better contacts to inuential members of the profession. In
this paper I estimate the sum of all aforementioned peer e¤ects.
The standard approach when estimating peer e¤ects consists of regressing an individuals
productivity on the average productivity of his peers. The productivity of academic researchers,
however, is not only a¤ected by the average quality of peers but also by the number of peers
they can interact with.
As university departments di¤er substantially in quality and size, it is important to distin-
guish these two dimensions of peer e¤ects among scientists. I therefore propose the following
regression which will be estimated for all scientists staying in Germany (in the following I will
refer to as "stayers"):
(1) # Publicationsiut = 1 + 2(Peer Quality)ut + 3(# of Peers)ut
+ 4Age Dummiesiut + 5YearFEt + 6IndividualFEi + "iut
I regress the number of publications of scientist i in university u and year t on measures
of his peer group and other controls. The regressions are estimated separately for physics,
chemistry, and mathematics because the subjects under consideration have di¤erent publication
and collaboration patterns. Peer quality is calculated as the mean of the average productivity of
a researchers peers.10 Over time changes in average peer quality only occur if the composition
of the department changes. Yearly uctuations in publications of the same set of peers do
10To measure average peer quality I use the department mean of individual productivities calculated between
1925 and 1938. An alternative way of measuring average peer quality uses only pre-dismissal years. This
measure, however, is not dened for researchers coming into the sample after 1933. I therefore present results
using the rst measure. Using the alternative measure does not a¤ect my ndings.
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therefore not a¤ect peer quality. The underlying assumption is that Albert Einstein always
had the same e¤ect on his peers independently of how much he published in a given year.
It is likely that the e¤ect of peers is only measurable after a certain time lag. Peers inuence
the creation of new ideas and papers before the actual date of publication. Another delay is
caused by publication lags. Science research is published much faster than research in other
subjects like economics. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the e¤ect of peers should be measured
with a lag of about one year. Coauthoring of scientists staying in Germany with colleagues
who were dismissed in 1933 and 1934 allow the investigation of likely lags of peer interactions.
Figure A1 in online appendix 1 reports the fraction of papers that stayers coauthored with
dismissed scientists. As chemists not only copublished a larger amount of their papers but also
published more papers on average, the data for chemistry is the least noisy. The number of
stayerspublications with the dismissed scientists plummeted in 1935, exactly the year after the
dismissals considered in this paper. I therefore use a one year lag for the peer group variables
when estimating equation (1). Using di¤erent lags does not a¤ect the results.
The regression also includes a full set of 5-year age-group dummies to control for life-cycle
changes in productivity. Year xed e¤ects control for yearly uctuations in publications which
a¤ect all researchers in the same way. To control for di¤erences in a researchers talent I add
individual xed e¤ects to all specications. In some robustness checks I also add university
xed e¤ects to control for university specic factors a¤ecting a researchers productivity. These
can be separately identied because some scientists change universities.
4.2 Using the Dismissals as Instruments for the Number and Qual-
ity of Peers
Estimating equation (1) using OLS would lead to biased estimates of 2 and 3. An important
problem is caused by selection. Selection not only occurs because scientists self-select into
departments with peers of similar quality but also because departments appoint professors
of similar productivity. Omitted variables, such as the (unobserved) construction of a new
laboratory, may further complicate the estimation of peer e¤ects. Furthermore, measuring peer
quality with error could bias the regression estimates.11
To address these problems I propose the dismissal of scientists by the Nazi government as
an instrument for the peer group of scientists. Figure 1 shows the e¤ect of the dismissal on the
peer group of physicists.
11Even good measures of peer quality, such as the average number of citation weighted publications, are by
no means perfect measures of peer inuence.
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Figure 1: E¤ect of Dismissals on Department Size and Peer Quality
Note: The left hand panel reports average department size in departments with (dashed line) and without (solid line)
dismissals respectively. The right hand panel reports average department quality in the two sets of departments. De-
partment quality is measured by the department mean of average citation weighted publications in top journals between
1925-1938. See section 4.1. for details.
The left-hand panel shows average department size for two groups of physicists: physicists in
departments with dismissals in 1933 or 1934 and physicists in departments without dismissals.
The gure shows that a¤ected departments were of above average size and that the dismissals led
to a strong and permanent reduction in department size. The dismissed were not immediately
replaced because of a lack of suitable researchers without a position and slow appointment
procedures.12 The right-hand panel of Figure 1 shows the evolution of average peer quality in
departments with dismissals and in departments without dismissals. The dismissed were on
average more productive than physicists who were not dismissed. As a result, average peer
quality in a¤ected departments fell after 1933. The graph only shows averages for the two
groups of departments and therefore understates the variation I am using in the regression
analysis. As can be seen from Table 2, some departments with dismissals also lost below
average quality peers. Average department quality increased in those departments. Overall,
however, the dismissal reduced average department quality in physics. Online appendix gures
A2 and A3 show the evolution of department size and quality for chemistry and mathematics.
In chemistry, a¤ected departments were of above-average quality but the di¤erence was less
pronounced than in physics. Despite the fact that the dismissals did not have a large e¤ect on
peer quality for the average across all departments it strongly a¤ected average quality in many
12Successors for dismissed chaired professors of Jewish origin, for example, could only be appointed if the
dismissed scholars ceded all pension rights because they were originally placed into early retirement. The
employers did not want to pay the salary for the replacement and the pension for the dismissed professor at
the same time. It thus took years to ll open positions in most cases. Highlighting this problem, Max Wien a
physicist in Jena, wrote a letter to Bernhard Rust the Minister of Education in late November 1934. Describing
the situation for chaired professorships at the German universities he wrote that out of the 100 existing [chaired
professor] teaching positions, 17 are not lled at present, while under natural retirements maybe two or three
would be vacant. This state of a¤airs gives cause for the gravest concern...(cited after Hentschel, 1996).
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departments as can be seen from Table 2. The e¤ects in departments with reductions in average
peer quality and in departments with improvements in peer quality, however, almost cancel out
in the aggregate. In mathematics, departments with dismissals were on average larger and of
higher quality. After 1933, department size and peer quality fell sharply in a¤ected departments.
The fact that most of the dismissals occurred in bigger and better departments does not
invalidate the identication strategy as level e¤ects will be taken out by including individual
xed e¤ects. The crucial assumption for the di¤erence-in-di¤erences type strategy is that trends
in a¤ected versus una¤ected departments were the same prior to the dismissal. Below, I show
in various ways that this was indeed the case.13
I use the dismissals to instrument for average peer quality and the number of peers. The
two rst stage regressions are:
(2) Avg. Peer Qualityut = 1 + 2(Dismissal induced Fall in Peer Quality)ut + 3(# Dismissed)ut
+ 4Age Dummiesiut + 5YearFEt + 6IndividualFEi + "iut
(3) # of Peersut = 1 + 2(Dismissal induced Fall in Peer Quality)ut + 3(# Dismissed)ut
+ 4Age Dummiesiut + 5YearFEt + 6IndividualFEi + "iut
Equation (2) is the rst stage regression for average peer quality. The crucial instrument for
average peer quality is called dismissal induced fall in average peer quality. It measures how
much peer quality fell because of the dismissals. The variable is 0 until 1933 in all departments.
After 1933 it is dened as follows:
Dismissal induced Fall in Peer Quality = (Avg. Peer Quality before 1933) (Avg. Peer Quality before 1933jStayer)
After 1933, dismissal induced fall in peer qualityis positive for scientists in departments
with dismissals of above average department quality. The variable remains 0 for researchers
in departments without dismissals or for scientists who lost peers whose quality was below
the department average.14 The instrument is based on changes in peer quality measured by
1925-1932 productivity measures. Using quality measures after 1933 in the construction of the
instrumental variable would be problematic because post 1933 productivity may be a¤ected by
the dismissals.
The second instrument is the number of dismissals in a given department. The variable is 0
until 1933 and equal to the number of dismissals thereafter.15
13The fact that mostly bigger and better departments were a¤ected by the dismissals a¤ects the interpretation
of the IV estimates. According to the LATE interpretation of IV (Imbens and Angrist, 1994), IV estimates
the e¤ect of changes in size and quality for large and high quality departments. As nowadays most science
departments are bigger than in the average in the early 20th century this LATE e¤ect is potentially more
interesting than the corresponding ATE.
14The implicit assumption is that below average dismissals did not a¤ect the productivity of scientists. An
alternative way of dening dismissal induced fall in peer qualitywould be to allow the dismissal of below
average peers to have a positive impact on the productivity of scientists. In specications not reported in this
paper I have explored this. The results do not change.
15The variable is 0 until 1933 for all departments (as I use a one year lag in the peer group variables it is
0 for 1933 inclusive). In 1934 it is equal to the number of researchers who were dismissed in 1933 in a given
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The dismissals may have caused some scientists to change university after 1933. The change
is likely to be endogenous and thus have a direct e¤ect on researchersproductivity. I therefore
assign each scientist the dismissal variables for the department he attended at the beginning of
1933. As the dismissal e¤ect is likely to be correlated for all stayers in a department I cluster
standard errors at the university level.
5 The E¤ect of Dismissals on Scientists who remained
in Germany
As a starting point of the empirical analysis I show how the dismissals a¤ected the productivity
of scientists who stayed at the German universities. Figure 2 plots yearly publications of stayers
in physics departments with and without dismissals. While yearly uctuations in top journal
publications are relatively large, the dismissal does not seem to have an obvious e¤ect on
publications of stayers. Equivalent gures for chemistry and mathematics show similar patterns
(Figures A4 and A5 in the online appendix).
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Figure 2: E¤ect of Dismissals on Stayers
Note: The Figure reports average yearly publications in top journals of stayers in a¤ected (dashed line) and una¤ected
(solid line) departments respectively.
To obtain a quantitative estimate of the dismissal I estimate the reduced form equation.
(4) # Publicationsiut = 1 + 2(Dismissal induced Fall in Peer Quality)ut + 3(# Dismissed)ut
department. From 1935 onwards it is equal to the number of dismissals in 1933 and 1934. I use the example
of Göttingen to illustrate the denition of the IV. Göttingen experienced 10 dismissals in mathematics in 1933
and one dismissal in 1934. The # dismissed variable for mathematicians in Göttingen is therefore 0 until 1933.
It is equal to 10 in 1934 and equal to 11 from 1935 onwards. Dismissal induced reduction in peer quality is
dened accordingly.
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+ 4Age Dummiesiut + 5YearFEt + 6IndividualFEi + "iut
I regress a researchers (citation-weighted) publications in each year on the instruments
proposed above. This regression is essentially a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimate of the dis-
missal e¤ect. It compares changes in publications from the pre to the post-dismissal period
for researchers in a¤ected departments to the change between the two periods for una¤ected
researchers. If the dismissals had a negative e¤ect on the productivity of stayers, one would
expect negative coe¢ cients on the dismissal variables.
Estimated coe¢ cients are all very close to 0 and only one coe¢ cient on the number of dis-
missals is signicantly negative (Table 4). Coe¢ cients are larger for regressions using citation-
weighted publications as dependent variable because the mean of citation weighted publications
is much larger. Most of the coe¢ cients on the dismissal induced fall in peer quality have a pos-
itive sign. This is particularly surprising as peer quality is usually believed to be the main
driver of peer e¤ects.
It is interesting to investigate which e¤ect sizes can be ruled out given the 95 percent con-
dence intervals of my results. For the number of dismissals one can rule out a reduction in
publications of more than 0.06 after losing one peer in physics (the mean of publications in the
pre-dismissal period is 0.47). For chemistry and mathematics one can rule out e¤ects larger (in
absolute magnitude) than 0.036 (mean of publications is 1.69) and 0.050 (mean of publications
is 0.33).
To evaluate which e¤ect size can be ruled out at 95 percent condence for the reduction
in peer quality, I use the following thought experiment: Suppose a department of average
quality and average size loses one Nobel Laureate (of average Nobel Laureate quality) due to
the dismissal. How much of a drop in stayerspublications can I rule out with 95 percent
condence? This is an appealing question as this may be related to a top department today
that loses a Nobel Laureate to another university. The results indicate that the e¤ect of losing
a Nobel Laureate would reduce yearly publications of stayers in physics by at most 0.0019
publications (the mean of publications is 0.47).16 In chemistry the quality loss associated
with losing a Nobel Laureate would not reduce publications by more than 0.031 (the mean of
publications is 1.69). In mathematics one can rule out a fall in publications of 0.048 for losing
a top 20 mathematician, as there is no Nobel prize in mathematics (the mean of publications
is 0.33.
Publications and citation weighted publications are count data with a relatively large pro-
portion of zeros and can never be negative. Instead of OLS one may therefore prefer to estimate
the reduced form using a model that specically addresses the nature of the data. Table A5
in the online appendix reports Poisson regressions of the reduced form. The results are very
similar.17
16This is calculated as follows. Average department quality in 1933 was 5.35. Average department size in
1933 was 13.18. The average Nobel Laureates quality was 17.22. Department quality after the dismissal falls
by 0.97 to 4.38. The estimated reduced form coe¢ cient is 0.03 with a 95 percent condence interval of [-0.0020
0.061]. The reduction in peer quality therefore has at most an e¤ect of -0.0020*0.97 = 0.0019.
17As Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010) describe, including a xed e¤ect for a scientist who never publishes
14
An important assumption for using the dismissals to identify peer e¤ects is that publication
trends of stayers in a¤ected and una¤ected departments would have followed the same trend in
the absence of the dismissals. To investigate this identication assumption I therefore estimate
a placebo experiment using the pre-dismissal period, only, and moving the dismissal from 1933
to 1930. The results reported in online appendix Table A6 indicate that stayers in departments
with dismissals did not follow di¤erent productivity trends before 1933.
6 Using the Dismissals to Identify Localized Peer E¤ects
in Science
6.1 Department Level Peer E¤ects
In this section, I use the dismissals to provide exogenous variation in an empirical model that
explicitly estimates localized peer e¤ects. I rst estimate the two rst stage equations; one for
average peer quality and the other one for the number of peers.
Dismissal induced fall in peer qualityhas a very strong and signicant e¤ect on average
peer quality in all three subjects (Table 5, columns 1, 3, and 5). The number of dismissals
does not signicantly a¤ect average peer quality in physics and chemistry but is signicant for
mathematics.
First stage regressions for the number of peers are reported in columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 5.
Dismissal induced fall in peer qualitydoes not a¤ect the number of peers, but the number of
dismissals has a strong and signicant e¤ect on the number of peers. This pattern is reassuring
as it indicates that the dismissals indeed provide two orthogonal instruments: one for average
peer quality and one for department size.18
Table 6 reports results from estimating the peer e¤ects model according to equation 1. The
OLS results are not very informative due to the problems illustrated in the identication section.
I therefore turn immediately to discussing IV results where I use the dismissals to instrument
for the peer group variables. While columns 2, 6, and 10 report results for publications as
dependent variable, columns 4, 8 and 12 report results for citation weighted publications.
Coe¢ cients on the peer group variables are very small and none is signicantly di¤erent from
0. The coe¢ cient on average peer quality even has a negative sign in most specications. The
results indicate that the number, and in particular the quality of peers is unlikely to a¤ect
leads to convergence problems as the (pseudo) maximum likelihood does not exist in this case. Standard
regression packages do not address this problem and will therefore lead to non-convergence of the estimator. I
therefore use the ppml command as suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2011).
18The model is just identied as the number of instruments is equal to the number of endogenous variables.
Therefore one has to worry less about bias due to weak instruments. Stock and Jogo (2005) characterize
instruments to be weak not only if they lead to biased IV results but also if hypothesis tests of IV parameters
su¤er from severe size distortions. They propose values of the Cragg-Donald (1993) minimum eigenvalue statistic
for which a Wald test at the 5 percent level will have an actual rejection rate of no more than 10 percent. For two
endogenous regressors and two instruments the critical value is 7.03 and thus always below the Cragg-Donald
EV statistics reported in Table 5.
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the productivity of scientists. The result holds for the two di¤erent productivity measures.
This indicates that di¤erences in citations for articles from scientists in departments with or
without dismissals cannot explain the ndings. Furthermore, the result is robust across the
three di¤erent subjects.
6.2 Robustness of Department Level IV Results
Surprisingly, I do not nd evidence for peer e¤ects at the local level. I therefore estimate a
number of robustness checks to analyse the sensitivity of this result. All regressions results
discussed in this section are reported in the online appendix. To investigate whether the results
are driven by disruption a¤ecting the whole academic system during the early dismissal years I
estimate the IV results dropping 1933 and 1934 from the regression. Omitting those turbulent
years does not a¤ect my ndings (Table A7, column 1).
Peer e¤ects may be especially important in either the early or the later stages of a scientists
career. I investigate this hypothesis by splitting the sample into two groups: scientists younger
that fty years of age and scientists fty or older. There is no indication that peer e¤ects are
especially important for certain age groups as none of the coe¢ cients is signicantly di¤erent
from 0 (columns 2 and 3).
I furthermore investigate the importance of peer e¤ects in large versus small departments
(columns 4 and 5) and high quality versus low quality departments (columns 6 and 7). Cutting
the sample along these potentially important dimensions for peer e¤ects gives very similar
results.
The regressions reported above include year xed e¤ects and individual e¤ects. As scientists
move universities one can separately identify individual and university xed e¤ects. Column 8
reports results from specications that include university xed e¤ects in addition to individual
xed e¤ects. The results are very similar and in fact all results reported in this paper are almost
identical when I include university and individual xed e¤ects at the same time.
To rule out di¤erential productivity trends in a¤ected departments I include university spe-
cic time trends in the regressions. The inclusion of university specic time trends hardly
a¤ects the results (column 9). This provides further reassurance that di¤erential time trends
cannot explain the absence of peer e¤ects.
A further worry is that stayers may have taken over laboratories or experiments from the
dismissed in a¤ected departments. This may have had a positive e¤ect on their productivity
counteracting any possible negative e¤ects from the loss of peers. The mathematics results
should not be contaminated by such behaviour and are indeed very similar to the results for
the other two subjects. An additional way of exploring whether taking over laboratories may be
driving the results is to estimate the regression for theoretical physicists only. Even though the
results are less precisely estimated, the ndings show no evidence for peer e¤ects in theoretical
physics (column 10).
Using the dismissals as instrumental variables relies on the assumption that the dismissals
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only a¤ected scientistsproductivity through its e¤ect on the researcherspeer groups. It is
important to note that any factor a¤ecting all researchers in Germany in a similar way, such as a
possible decline of journal quality, will be captured by the year xed e¤ects and would thus not
invalidate the identication strategy. Because una¤ected departments act as a control group,
only factors changing at the same time as the dismissal and exclusively a¤ecting departments
with dismissals (or only those without dismissals) may be potential threats to the identication
strategy. Most of the potentially worrying biases, such as disruption e¤ects or increased teaching
loads, would bias the IV estimates in favour of nding peer e¤ects. As I do not nd evidence for
localized peer e¤ects, one has to worry less about these biases. Some violations of the exclusion
restriction, however, would lead me to underestimate peer e¤ects. In results discussed in more
detail in the online appendix (Appendix 1 and Table A8) I show that the dismissals were
unrelated to changes in promotion incentives. Furthermore, the dismissals were not related to
the probability that stayers left the sample for retirement or other reasons. I also show that
the number of ardent Nazi supporters, who could have beneted from preferential treatment by
the Nazi government, was not related to the dismissals. Finally, I show that changes in funding
are unlikely to drive my results.
6.3 Specialization Level Peer E¤ects
The denition of the peer group in the previous regressions was based on all peers in a scientists
department. It is, however, possible that the productivity of scientists is only a¤ected by peers
who work in very similar elds. To investigate this hypothesis I use the scientists specialization
to dene their peer group. According to this denition of the peer group, the relevant peers of
an experimental physicist are only the other experimentalists in his department, not theoretical
physicists, technical physicists or astrophysicists.
Similarly to the department level results, the coe¢ cients on the peer group variables are
very small and none of them is signicantly di¤erent from 0 (Table 7).19 Furthermore, the
coe¢ cients on peer quality mostly have the wrong sign if one were expecting positive peer
e¤ects. The results for mathematics are less precisely estimated because most mathematicians
did not conne their research to only one or two specialisations. Many of them were working on
very di¤erent topics that even today cannot be precisely assigned to particular specialisations.
Nonetheless, there is no evidence for any signicant peer e¤ects in mathematics. It may be
possible that localized peer e¤ects occur in even more specialized subelds. As the mean
number of researchers in the specialisations I consider here is about 3.5 these even smaller
subelds would have to be extremely specialized.
19First stage regressions for the specialization level results are reported in Table A9 in the online appendix.
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6.4 Peer E¤ects from High Quality Peers
Recent research on life scientists in the United States has indicated that star scientists have
a particularly large impact on coauthors (Azoulay, Zivin, and Wang, 2010). In the previous
regressions I have investigated how average peer quality a¤ects productivity. It may well be
the case that only colleagues of very high quality a¤ect the productivity of scientists.
To investigate this hypothesis I start by regressing yearly productivity on the number of
peers (instrumenting with the number of dismissals). I then investigate how the number of
peers of above median quality (now instrumenting with the number of above median quality
colleagues who were dismissed) a¤ect productivity; continuing with the number of peers in the
top quartile, in the top 10 percentile, and the top 5 percentile always instrumenting with the
number of dismissed peers in the relevant quality group. Since many of the dismissed scientists
were of very high quality I have enough variation in peer quality even at very high quality
levels.
First stage regressions are reported in online appendix Table A10 and are highly signicant
(with rst stage F-statistics between 8.2 and 488.6; only one of the 15 rst stage regressions have
a F-statistic below 10 and many have F-statistics above 100). Instrumental variable regressions
are reported in Table 8. Unlike previous tables, Table 8 reports di¤erent regressions for 5
di¤erent denitions of the relevant peers (number of peers, number of above median quality
peers, number of peers in top quartile, and so on). Strikingly, 28 of the estimated IV coe¢ cients
are not signicantly di¤erent from 0 and many of them even have a negative sign. 2 coe¢ cients
are signicantly di¤erent from 0 at the 5 percent level but have the wrong sign if one expected
that high quality peers have a positive e¤ect on their colleaguesproductivity. These results
provide further evidence that peers, even very high quality ones, do not seem to have a positive
e¤ect on the productivity of scientists.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
I have used the dismissal of scientists as exogenous variation in the quality and quantity of
peers and have shown that peers do not seem to a¤ect the productivity of scientists. The
nding is robust to analysing di¤erent subjects and across many di¤erent specications. This
is a surprising result given that many researchers believe that local peer e¤ects are important.
While only suggestive, there are a number of possible explanations for the lack of localized
peer e¤ects. First, I do not investigate long-run run e¤ects as my data ends 5 years after the 1933
dismissals. A second explanation may be that I analyse relatively established researchers. It is
quite likely that peer interactions become less important once one has established a scientic
career. In fact, the dismissal of high quality mathematics professors had strong negative e¤ects
on Ph.D. student outcomes (Waldinger, 2010). A further possible explanation for the absence
of localized peer e¤ects is that the scientic community in Germany before the Second World
War was very integrated. Conferences were common and scientists were very mobile within
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Germany. Geographic location of researchers may therefore not have been very important for
more established researchers. A further reason for the absence of localized peer e¤ects may be
that science is much more specialized than other subjects such as economics.
An important question is whether evidence on peer e¤ects in the 1920s and 1930s can help
us understand peer interactions today. A number of reasons suggest that the ndings of this
study may be relevant for understanding spillovers among present-day researchers. The three
subjects studied in this paper were already well established at that time, especially in Germany.
In fact, Germany was the leading country for scientic research in the rst decades of the 20th
century. If peer e¤ects are an important determinant of scientic productivity they are likely
to be especially important in a ourishing research environment such as Germany in the early
20th century. Scientic research at the time followed practices and conventions which were
very similar to current research methods. Scientists were publishing their results in refereed
academic journals, conferences were common, and researchers were surprisingly mobile within
the German speaking scientic community. Unlike today, they could not communicate via E-
mail. They did, however, vividly discuss their research in very frequent mail correspondence
with their colleagues in other universities.
Recent research on todays scientists also seems to suggest that localized spillovers are un-
likely to be important. Dubois, Rochet, and Schlenker (2010) show that localized spillovers do
not a¤ect the productivity of mathematicians between 1984 and 2006. Furthermore, Azoulay,
Zivin, and Wang (2010) nd that the loss of a local coauthor does not have a larger impact
on the productivity of life scientists than losing a coauthor who was located in a di¤erent
university.
The question remains why scientists behave as if local peers are a key input in the ideas
production process. One potential explanation is that being surrounded by esteemed peers
is purely a private benet, i.e. it enters a scientists utility function but does not a¤ect his
productivity. Another explanation could be that localized spillovers are important but they are
extremely localized.
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8 Tables
Table 1: Number of Dismissed Scientists across di¤erent Subjects
Physics Chemistry Mathematics
% of all % of all % of all
Number of Physicists Number of Chemists Number of Mathematicians
Year of Dismissal Dismissals in 1933 Dismissals in 1933 Dismissals in 1933
1933 33 11.5 50 10.7 35 15.6
1934 6 2.1 11 2.4 6 2.7
1935 4 1.4 5 1.1 5 2.2
1936 1 0.3 7 1.5 1 0.4
1937 1 0.3 3 0.6 2 0.9
1938 1 0.3 4 0.9 1 0.4
1939 1 0.3 2 0.4 1 0.4
1940 1 0.3 0 0.0 1 0.4
1933 - 1934 39 13.6 61 13.1 41 18.3
Note: The table reports the number of dismissals in the three subjects in each year between 1933 and 1940.
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Table 4: Reduced Form (Department Level Peers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Physics Chemistry Mathematics
Cit. weighted Cit. weighted Cit. weighted
Dependent Variable: Publications Publications Publications Publications Publications Publications
Dismissal Induced Fall 0.029 0.312 0.012 0.383 0.022 -0.464
in Peer Quality (0.015) (0.235) (0.015) (0.303) (0.031) (0.337)
Number Dismissed -0.021 -0.017 -0.018 -0.130 -0.018 -0.016
(0.017) (0.302) (0.009)* (0.222) (0.015) (0.167)
Age Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2261 2261 3584 3584 1538 1538
# of researchers 258 258 413 413 183 183
R-squared 0.39 0.25 0.67 0.54 0.32 0.20
**signicant at 1% level *signicant at 5% level (All standard errors clustered at university level)
Note: The dependent variable Publications is the sum of a scientists publications in top journals in a given year. The alternative
dependent variable Citation Weighted Publications is the sum of subsequent citations (in the rst 50 years after publication) to
articles published in top journals by a scientist in a given year. Explanatory variables are dened as follows. Dismissal induced
Fall in Peer Quality is 0 for all scientists until 1933. In 1934 it is equal to (Avg. quality of peers in department before dismissal)
- (Avg. quality of peers j not dismissed in 1933) if this number > 0. From 1935 onwards it is equal to (Avg. quality of peers in
department before dismissal) - (Avg. quality of peers j not dismissed between 1933 and 1934) if this number is > 0. The variable
remains 0 for all other scientists. For scientists in departments with above average quality dismissals "Dismissal induced Fall in
Peer Quality" is therefore positive after 1933. Number dismissed is equal to 0 for all scientists until 1933. In 1934 it is equal to the
number of dismissals in 1933 in a scientists department. From 1935 onwards it is equal to the number of dismissals between 1933
and 1934 in a scientists department.
Table 5: First Stages (Department Level Peers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Physics Chemistry Mathematics
Peer Department Peer Department Peer Department
Dependent Variable: Quality Size Quality Size Quality Size
Dismissal Induced Fall -0.644** -0.147 -1.114** 0.011 -1.355** -0.228
in Peer Quality (0.099) (0.130) (0.196) (0.110) (0.149) (0.174)
Number Dismissed 0.017 -0.570** -0.047 -0.998** 0.160** -0.470**
(0.098) (0.117) (0.162) (0.091) (0.053) (0.062)
Age Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2261 2261 3584 3584 1538 1538
# of researchers 258 258 413 413 183 183
R-squared 0.59 0.90 0.66 0.91 0.70 0.81
F - Test on Instruments 81.9 103.10 18.3 64.3 47.8 66.2
Cragg-Donald EV Statistic 12.8 89.8 46.7
**signicant at 1% level *signicant at 5% level (All standard errors clustered at the university level)
Note: Odd columns report the rst stage regression for peer quality corresponding to equation (2) in the text. Even columns report
the rst stage regression for department size corresponding to equation (3) in the text. The dependent variable Peer Quality is
measured as the mean of the average productivity of a scientists peers present in the department in a given year. The dependent
variable Department Size measures department size in a given year. Explanatory variables are dened as follows. Dismissal induced
Fall in Peer Quality is 0 for all scientists until 1933. In 1934 it is equal to (Avg. quality of peers in department before dismissal)
- (Avg. quality of peers j not dismissed in 1933) if this number > 0. From 1935 onwards it is equal to (Avg. quality of peers in
department before dismissal) - (Avg. quality of peers j not dismissed between 1933 and 1934) if this number is > 0. The variable
remains 0 for all other scientists. For scientists in departments with above average quality dismissals "Dismissal induced Fall in
Peer Quality" is therefore positive after 1933. Number dismissed is equal to 0 for all scientists until 1933. In 1934 it is equal to the
number of dismissals in 1933 at a scientists department. From 1935 onwards it is equal to the number of dismissals between 1933
and 1934 in a scientists department.
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Table 7: Instrumental Variables (Specialization Level Peers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV IV IV IV IV IV
Physics Chemistry Mathematics
Cit. weighted Cit. weighted Cit. weighted
Dependent Variable: Publications Publications Publications Publications Publications Publications
Specialization Peer Quality -0.021 -0.410 -0.010 -0.029 -0.429 3.822
(0.029) (0.581) (0.009) (0.127) (3.457) (28.153)
# Specialization Peers -0.021 -0.727 0.010 -0.725 0.465 -3.450
(0.029) (0.482) (0.040) (0.881) (3.487) (28.298)
Age Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2257 2257 3567 3567 1538 1538
# of researchers 256 256 405 405 183 183
Cragg-Donald EV Stat. 81.80 81.80 73.69 73.69 0.23 0.23
**signicant at 1% level *signicant at 5% level (All standard errors clustered at the university level)
Note: Each column reports results from a di¤erent IV regression. The dependent variable Publications is the sum of a scientists
publications in top journals in a given year. The alternative dependent variable Cit. weighted Publications is the sum of subsequent
citations (in the rst 50 years after publication) to articles published in top journals by a scientist in a given year. Explanatory
variables are dended as follows. Specialization Peer Quality is measured as the mean of the average productivity of a scientists
peers present in the department in his specialization in a given year. # Specialization Peers measures the number of peers in
a scienstists specialization in his departmentin a given year. I instrument for specialization peer quality and the number of
specialization peers with the dismissals at the specialization level. Corresponding rst stages are reported in Table A9.
27
Table 8: Instrumental Variables High Quality Peers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV IV IV IV IV IV
Physics Chemistry Mathematics
Publi- Cit. weigt. Publi- Cit. weigt. Publi- Cit. weigt.
Dependent Variable: cations Pubs. cations Pubs. cations Pubs.
Number of Peers -0.003 -0.329 0.016 0.041 0.022 0.284
(0.013) (0.198) (0.010) (0.231) (0.017) (0.380)
First Stage F-Statistic 195.5 195.5 126.7 126.7 104.9 104.9
Number of Top 50th Percentile -0.003 -0.221 0.027 0.174 0.019 0.219
Peers (0.009) (0.142) (0.017) (0.364) (0.016) (0.335)
First Stage F-Statistic 241.1 241.1 362.6 362.6 94.4 94.4
Number of Top 25th Percentile -0.015 -0.637* 0.026 0.000 0.001 0.140
Peers (0.016) (0.239) (0.017) (0.419) (0.016) (0.336)
First Stage F-Statistic 423.7 423.7 488.6 488.6 485.8 485.8
Number of Top 10th Percentile -0.011 -0.695 0.076 -0.545 0.004 0.439
Peers (0.032) (0.395) (0.048) (1.011) (0.030) (0.616)
First Stage F-Statistic 29.6 29.6 19.4 19.4 39.6 39.6
Number of Top 5th Percentile -0.031 -1.336* 0.160 0.805 0.026 0.686
Peers (0.043) (0.626) (0.126) (2.516) (0.020) (0.570)
First Stage F-Statistic 201.6 201.6 8.2 8.2 46.0 46.0
Age Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
**signicant at 1% level *signicant at 5% level (All standard errors clustered at the university level)
Note: Unlike the previous tables each column and each horizontal panel reports results from a di¤erent IV regression. The dependent
variable Publications is the sum of a scientists publications in top journals in a given year. The alternative dependent variable
Cit. weighted Publications is the sum of subsequent citations (in the rst 50 years after publication) to articles published in top
journals by a scientist in a given year. Explanatory variables are dended as follows. Number of Peers measures the number of
peers in a scientists department. Number of Top 50th Percentile Peers measures the number of peers in the top 50th percentile in
a scientists departments, and so on. Percentiles are calculated using pre-dismissal productivities. I instrument for the number of
peers (or number of high quality peers) using the number of dismissals of peers in that quality group in a scientists department.
Corresponding rst stages are reported in Table A10.
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